Anti-Corruption Policy Brief: Corruption and Terrorism in Kenya

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Corruption has been a problem in Kenya since before it declared its independence from Britain in 1963 (ten years before that, the stability of the state was fundamentally altered by the Mau Mau Uprising in 1952). Grand corruption in Kenya’s political leadership and petty corruption on all governmental levels are “vertically integrated,”1 upholding Kenya’s status in the top 1/3 of perceived most corrupt countries in the world.2 Since corruption is not contained by a country’s borders, corruption in Kenya has a negative impact on a global scale.Therefore, addressing corruption in Kenya is an issue of global importance.3 Petty corruption inKenya directly funds and indirectly leads to recruitment for terrorist organizations like al-Shabaab, which is based nearby in Somalia and has the potential to become a global security threat.4 Locally,al-Shaabab’s influence within the Kenyan National Police Force (KNPF) and Kenya DefenseForces (KDF) erodes public safety and trust, leading to an endemic culture of corruption in the state. Historically, attempts to challenge terrorism in Kenya have been thwarted by high levels of corruption within its government. Still, Kenya needs anti-corruption reform at all governmental levels, especially in its police and security forces. The United States (U.S.) Government must collude with the Kenyan Government to hold their state leaders accountable for their commitment to combatting corruption at all local and state levels through internal and external measures not limited to chief of state and diplomatic, citizens’, and aid tools.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT/SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM

Kenya's corruption problem has pervaded all levels of government since its independence from Britain in 1963. Jomo Kenyatta, the first Prime Minister and then President of Kenya, instituted a legacy of grand corruption while in power. Though widely known as a shrewd politician and respected for his anti-colonialist views, he used his presidential power to acquire property and accumulate wealth through ruby mining, the charcoal and ivory trades, and instituted a one-party autocratic rule, leading a widely corrupt government until his death in 1978.5 His son Uhuru Kenyatta later became President in 2013, becoming part of an enduring legacy in Kenya where only a handful of families are in charge politically (not unlike some political dynasties in the United States), which fuels economic and class divisions and questions about unfairly acquired wealth and power. Grand corruption, as its called, constitutes “the abuse of high-level power that benefits the few at the expense of the many”6 and tends to conflict with genuine efforts to tackle anti-corruption reform.

Petty Corruption is the “everyday abuse of entrusted power by public officials in their interactions with ordinary citizens, who often are trying to access basic goods or services in places like hospitals, schools, police departments and other agencies.”7 The scope of petty corruption is difficult to measure because its importance is often deemphasized in conversations about corruption; however, petty corruption in Kenya, particularly within the Kenyan National PoliceForce (KNPF) and Kenya Defense Forces (KDF), has a disproportionate affect on security and stability in Kenya, eroding public health, trust, and safety, and funding terrorism and leading to terrorist acts. Links between the KDF and al-Shabaab have been reported since al-Shabaab’s initial bribes in exchange for border crossings, allowing unfettered access to and from Kenya from al-Shabaab members in Somalia. Bribery is encouraged in police forces by chiefs who reportedly establish minimum quotas for bribes from officers.9 Furthermore, since as early as 2013, the KDF has collaborated with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to smuggle sugar over theSomalia border, resulting in $200-400 millions of dollars in funding for al-Shabaab.10 During theCovid-19 Pandemic, police officers in Kenya asked for bribes in exchange for violating Covid-19health safety protocols, such as curfews and quarantines.11 The pervasiveness of petty corruption inKenya leads to a general lack of trust in government institutions, such as police protection, health and safety in hospitals, and judicial processes. The feelings of powerlessness and disenfranchisement that result sow discord among Kenyan citizens, leaving them vulnerable to more corrupt practices, including recruitment from terrorist organizations such as al-Shabaab.12 Reports from Transparency International indicate that 50% of Kenyans say they have paid bribes to police officers and 75% of Kenyans believe that all or most police officers are corrupt.13 The average urban Kenyan reportedly pays 16 bribes per month, usually to police officers or bureaucrats.14 Corruption begets corruption and studies indicate a strong positive link of terrorist activity in countries with high levels of corruption.15

In an effort to combat corruption within the government, Kenya instituted a new constitution in2010 to replace the one instituted in 1963, but questions about the role of government and democratic processes in Kenya have persisted. In July 2015, U.S. President Barack Obama decries the "cancer of corruption” plaguing Kenya and put forth initiatives to combat it including the"Government of the Republic of Kenya—Government of the United States of America JointCommitment to Promote Good Governance and Anti-Corruption Efforts in Kenya,”16 a comprehensive joint commitment from both governments affirming outlining anti-corruption policy recommendations. The United States additionally pledged more than $1 million to set up a specialKenyan investigative unit to uncover public corruption connected to transnational crime.17 However, funding must be allocated to fighting corruption through a counterterrorism framework to be most effective.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

When we consider that terrorism from groups such as al-Shabaab is a transnational issue affecting security across the globe, we can understand the urgent significance of confronting grand and petty corruption at all government levels in Kenya, but especially in the KNPF and KDF. This will be an essential step in combatting the proliferation of terrorism worldwide. Combatting this kind of corruption within Kenya, however, will require a strong commitment of political will from Kenya's leaders. The U.S. Government and NGOs funding anti-corruption efforts must hold Kenyan leaders to be transparent, accountable, and willing to combat their own internal systems of corruption.

Initiatives to address terrorism specifically thus far in Kenya have been thwarted by the government's refusal to acknowledge the connection between corruption and terrorism. In 2016,President Kenyatta issued a National Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism, but “failed to mention the role of corruption in fostering terrorism.”18 The United States has sent millions of dollars to Kenyan security forces despite the high levels of corruption within those entities.Additionally USAID’s Countering Violent Extremism (2019)19 program in Kenya addresses important social issues, but not corruption.20 However, addressing petty corruption at all government levels, but especially in the KNPF and KDF will be essential to restoring safety, security, public trust, and combatting terrorism activity in Kenya.

As corruption in Kenya is widespread, the following policy recommendations are put forth to commit to less corruption in Kenya at all levels, with particular focus on counterterrorism initiative in the KNPF and KDF. Policy recommendations are subdivided by Chief of State and DiplomaticTools, Aid Tools, and Citizen’s Tools, categories from Sarah Chayes’ Theives of State: WhyCorruption Threatens Global Security.

CHIEF OF STATE AND DIPLOMATIC TOOLS

The U.S. has had a diplomatic relationship with Kenya since its independence. Today the U.S. andKenya have a strong bilateral relationship. This relationship became closer in 2002 when Kenya became a democracy and could be further strengthened through Kenya’s commitment to counterterrorism by fighting corruption. Efforts to incentivize Kenyan Government officials in anti corruption and counterterrorism should be abetted by the U.S. Government by hosting status enhancing face-to-face meetings with Kenyan political leaders who publicly speak to the connections between terrorism and corruption and commit to actively impose tangible anti corruption policies and remedies within all systems of government. The U.S. Government should also refuse publicized meetings with Kenyan leaders who are perpetuating corrupt systems and deny their complicity in funding terrorism. Furthermore, to perpetuate an enduring partnership which both countries are interested in protecting, the U.S. should call out instances of acute corruption inKenya and publicly “name and shame” and deny visas to those leaders who have committed to corrupt practices as they too are funding terrorism in Kenya and beyond.

AID TOOLS

Thus far, foreign aid from the U.S. Government and NGOs have been effective in instituting anti corruption measures in Kenya, however more effort needs to go toward auditing where aid money goes—an audit in 2016, estimated that only 1% of spending from the state budget was lawful.21 Additionally, aid programs need to explicitly draw connections between corruption and terrorism in educational programs and policy initiatives.

Historically, there have been incentives for Kenyan leaders to denounce corruption. In 2020, whenPresident Kenyatta reaffirmed his commitment to addressing corruption in his address to the nation, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) supported him and in turn furthered their technical assistance to the justice sector as well as the private sector.22 Similarly, TransparencyInternational (TI) Kenya anti-corruption efforts have included education in primary and secondary schools via Integrity Clubs, raising public awareness through public radio spots that denounce terrorism, graffiti and murals to reach absent students, traveling legal advice clinics which hold forums to make villagers aware of corruption and its effects, and an anonymous reporting system that operates in collaboration with human rights groups.23

The U.S Government and NGOs must continue to develop capacity building initiatives in Kenya that specifically address counterterrorism and corruption issues within the KNPF and KDF.However, certain provisions must be added to ensure accountability with resources:

a. The U.S. Government will develop a specialized partnership with the KenyanGovernment, the KNPF, and the KDF to educate the members of the police forces about corruption, the dangers of bribery, its connections to terrorism, and develop a zero tolerance policy on bribery in the police forces.

b. In the absence of meaningful anti-corruption reform and clear evidence of where the funds are allocated, the U.S. Government will impose sanctions on any money allocated to Kenyan government entities, particularly its police forces, the KNPF and KDF.

c. The U.S. Government must collude with the Kenyan Government to develop a united task force which regularly audits the use of U.S. Government funds in Kenya and specifically toward anti-corruption efforts and as it pertains to its police forces, theKNPF and KDF.

CITIZENS’ TOOLS

Private citizens can assist anti-corruption efforts in Kenya by utilizing tools that have already been established to safely address anti-corruption efforts. Kenya’s once-active page on I Paid A Bribe(IPAB) (iPaidaBribe.com) went defunct in 2015 due to a lack of funding.24 However, IPAB now offers a free service for organizations wanting to set it up for bribe transparency in their country, stating:

“we will use them to argue for improving governance systems and procedures, tightening law enforcement and regulation and thereby reduce the scope for corruption in obtaining services from the government. We invite you to register any recent or old bribes you have paid. Please tell us if you resisted a demand for a bribe, or did not have to pay a bribe, because of a new procedure or an honest official who helped you. We do not ask for your name or phone details, so feel free to report on the formats provided.”25

A service like IPAB in Kenya would enhance education around bribery, provide anonymity toKenyan citizens wanting to report bribery, and help “name and shame” perpetrators and bad actors in the state. In order to encourage this, funding should be allocated to educate citizens and local leaders about current anti-corruption initiatives, such as IPAB and those by TI. Kenya should also work with the Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) on ensuring whistleblower protections. To promote transparency and accountability, the Kenyan Government should regularly publish ways in which it is tackling corruption within its own ranks and systems including by cutting red tape(which encourages expediency through bribery, etc.), and increase accountability and oversight by holding public trials for those accused of contributing to petty corruption.

CONCLUSION

In Sarah Chayes 'Thieves of State: Why Corruption Threatens Global Security, she argues “Acutely Corrupt governance doesn’t just aid terrorist organizations by driving indignant citizens into their arms; it provides haven and logistical support for those very same groups, as officials avert their eyes in exchange for a bribe”26 A lack of faith in any government can quickly lead to statewide division, which compounds corruption in lower levels of government and among citizens. Grand and petty corruption are categorized separately, but the distrust one sows perpetuates the other.When we consider that “many in Kenya’s political elite have close connections with organized crime, gangs, weapons, drugs, and producing counterfeit money,”27 the connections between grand and petty corruption and terrorism become more apparent and potentially dangerous on a global scale. Reforming these entities will require a strong amount of political will on the part of Kenyan governmental officials, which can be incentivized by the U.S. Government and NGOs through rewards for reform in the form of loans, grants, positive public attention, developmental assistance.

---

1 Chayes, S. (2016). Chapter 14: Remedies. In Thieves of State: Why corruption threatens global security (pp. 172–194). essay, W.W. Norton and Company. p. 191

2 Transparency.org. 2022. 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index - Explore Kenya’s results. [online] Available at: <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021/index/ken>.

3 Gettleman, J. (2015, November 4). An anticorruption plea in Kenya: 'please, just steal a little'. The New York Times. Retrieved December 13, 2022, from https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/05/world/africa/kenya-government-corruption.html 

4 Council on Foreign Relations. (n.d.). Al-Shabaab. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved December 13, 2022, from https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-shabaab 

5 Maloba, W. O. (2017). The Anatomy of Neo-Colonialism in Kenya: British Imperialism and Kenyatta, 1963–1978. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

6 Transparency International . (n.d.). Grand corruption - corruptionary A-Z. Transparency.org. Retrieved December 13, 2022, from https://www.transparency.org/en/corruptionary/grand-corruption 

7

https://www.transparency.org/en/corruptionary/pettycorruption#:~:text=Everyday%20abuse%20of%20entrusted%20power,police%20departments%20and%20other%20agencie 

8 Claire Klobucista, Jonathan Masters, and Mohammed A Sergie, “Al-Shabab,” Council on Foreign Relations (Council on Foreign Relations, May 19, 2021), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-shabab 

9 “How Corrupt Is Kenya?,” YouTube (NowThis World, January 22, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s3fw7Jxj28k 

10 Eisen, N., 2022. Corruption and terrorism: The case of Kenya. [online] Brookings. Available at: <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/08/22/corruption-and-terrorism-the- case-of-kenya/> 

11 “Police Corruption Is Becoming a Pandemic Too - News,” Transparency.org (Transparency International, September 23, 2020), https://www.transparency.org/en/news/police-corruption-is-becoming-a-pandemic-too 

12 Eisen, N., 2022. Corruption and terrorism: The case of Kenya. [online] Brookings. Available at: <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/08/22/corruption-and-terrorism-the- case-of-kenya/> 

13 Transparency.org. 2022. 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index - Explore Kenya’s results. [online] Available at: <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021/index/ken>. 

14“ How Corrupt Is Kenya?,” YouTube (NowThis World, January 22, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s3fw7Jxj28k 

15 “Vision of Humanity | Destination for Peace” (Institute for Economics and Peace, November 2020), https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/GTI-2020-web-1.pdf 

16 National Archives and Records Administration. (n.d.). Government of the Republic of Kenya-Government of the United States of America joint commitment to promote good governance and anti-corruption efforts in Kenya. National Archives and Records Administration. Retrieved December 13, 2022, from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/07/25/governmentrepublic-kenya-government-united-states-america-joint

 17 Gettleman, J. (2015, November 4). An anticorruption plea in Kenya: 'please, just steal a little'. The New York Times. Retrieved December 13, 2022, from https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/05/world/africa/kenya-government-corruption.html

18 Eisen, N., 2022. Corruption and terrorism: The case of Kenya. [online] Brookings. Available at: <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/08/22/corruption-and-terrorism-the- case-of-kenya/> 

19“ East Africa, Kenya and Somalia - USAID.GOV” (USAID From the American People, February 2019), https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/Countering_Violent_Extremism_fact_sheet_February_2019.pdf 

20 Eisen, N., 2022. Corruption and terrorism: The case of Kenya. [online] Brookings. Available at: <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/08/22/corruption-and-terrorism-the- case-of-kenya/> 

21 “How Corrupt Is Kenya?,” YouTube (NowThis World, January 22, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s3fw7Jxj28k 

22 Christine.opiyo. (n.d.). United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. UNODC welcomes President of Kenya's renewed anticorruption pledge. Retrieved December 14, 2022, from https://www.unodc.org/easternafrica/Stories/unodc-welcomes-president-ofkenyas-renewed-anti-corruption-pledge.html 

23 Transparency International. (n.d.). 5 ways Kenyans are fighting corruption - news. Transparency.org. Retrieved December 13, 2022, from https://www.transparency.org/en/news/5-ways-kenyans-are-fighting-corruption 

24 Strom, S. (2012, March 7). Web sites shine light on petty bribery worldwide. The New York Times. Retrieved December 13, 2022, from https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/07/business/web-sites-shine-light-on-petty-bribery-worldwide.html 

25 I Paid a Bribe (IPAB). (n.d.). I paid a bribe. Retrieved December 13, 2022, from https://www.ipaidabribe.com/bribecentral/registration-apartment-0

26 Chayes, S. (2016). Chapter 14: Remedies. In Thieves of state: Why corruption threatens global security (pp. 172–194). Essay, W.W. Norton and Company. P. 172 

27“ How Corrupt Is Kenya?,” YouTube (NowThis World, January 22, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s3fw7Jxj28k